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ABSTRACT 
This manuscript examines two accounts that discuss rights disputes. 
On the one hand, Russ Shafer-Landau argues for specificationism (or 
what is referred to here as SA), which deems rights as having innate 
limitations. One the other, Judith Jarvis Thomson defends 
infringement theory (or what is referred to here as IVA), which views 
rights to be competing factors. Shafer-Landau in “Specifying Absolute 
Rights” endeavored to discredit Thomson’s IVA and promote his 
favored theory. This material responds to and criticizes the claims 
Shafer-Landau pressed in his article. First part of the thesis addresses 
his concerns and finds them unconvincing. Using tools of logic, it is 
demonstrated that Shafer-Landau’s demands on compensation are 
without warrant. More than this, his demands on the tripartite are 
misguided. Second part tackles some shortcomings of SA. One of 
which is the finding that two of the three arguments Shafer-Landau 
posited for SA’s superiority run counter to each other. Should Shafer-
Landau save one, it would remain untenable for the foundations 
therein rest on a mistake. Finally, his position of SA being suﬃciently 
explanatory is in itself wanting. Though this material does not go as far 
as proving which theory is practically better, the project is not bereft of 
purpose. By the end, IVA would already have been relieved of the 
criticisms whereas SA would be confronted with multiple challenges.  
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I. Int ro duct ion 
 Maria promised a friend that she would meet her at lunch in the park. Because of this 
promise Maria made, the friend is now entitled to expect her at the time and place agreed. Maria, 
on the other end of the promise, is obligated to assure that what has been promised obtains. But 
suppose minutes before the agreed time, Maria receives a phone call from her boss requesting 
her to address an untimely client concern. As an employee, Maria is obliged to answer to her 
boss and to the client. In such a case, both the friend and the employer have rights for Maria’s 
presence and efforts. However, due to that the two activities are to happen at the same time in 
different locations, Maria could not possibly attend to both. At best, she could only fulfill either 
one of the claims. 
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 This case is an instance of what has come to be known as the conflict of rights. A conflict of 
rights occurs when two or more rights cannot be acted upon, fulfilled, protected or, in general, 
advanced at the same time.  1
 Here, the conflict is between the friend’s right to Maria’s presence and the employer’s 
right to her efforts. Since the two cannot be fulfilled simultaneously, here arises a tension 
between the friend’s and the employer’s separate claims. The two rights are in conflict with each 
other because Maria—the entity to whom the entitlements are directed at—is in no position to 
assure that the two rights obtain. She can only pursue one, and the pursuance of one results to a 
compromise of the other. 
 Apart from this quotidian example, the issue of conflicting rights is echoed, if not more 
pronounced, in the legal sphere. Majority of cases filed in courts concerns opposed claims by 
aggrieved parties. In fact, before the high court is legible to adjudicate on a case, one of the 
requisites is that “there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights 
susceptible of judicial determination.”  2
 To name a distinct few from the indefinitely increasing pool, one citizen has filed charges 
against newspaper group, complaining that the newspaper published defamatory claims against 
him. The court perceived this as a strife between the newspaper’s right to free expression and the 
citizen’s right against defamation.  In another, a group of parents on behalf of their children sued 3
a school for expelling the children who resisted participation in a flag ceremony. The parents and 
children belonged to a certain religious sect which discouraged them from participating in 
ceremonial rights. The problem revolves around the children’s right to exercise their religion and 
the school’s right to expel students.  Third and last, in a landmark case, a union of workers filed 4
suit against its employer, arguing that the employer is depriving the workers of their right to 
assembly. Rightfully so, the court construed it as a conflict between the worker’s right to 
assembly and the owner’s right to property.  5
 These are just among the multitude of cases embodying rights disputes. Within the law, 
rights are the central elements of issues to be resolved. Outside of law, rights, entitlements, and 
claims are also controlling figures. Rights are involved in the most mundane and most complex 
of situations. In almost every case, one could invoke a right to which one is entitled to. In such a 
 The use of “advancement” to encompass the variety of actions concerning rights is adopted from Hallie 1
Liberto. See Hallie Liberto, “The Moral Specification of Rights: A Restricted Account,” Law and Philosophy 
33, no. 2 (2014): 195, DOI: 10.1007/s10982-013-9183-4.
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system where rights are easily available to us, tension between and among rights are practically 
everywhere. 
 Given this ubiquity, philosophers and legal scholars alike have probed, and continues to do so, 
this phenomenon of competing rights. In trying to resolve the apparent conflict of rights, multiple 
theories have been proposed.  The two I will be examining here are Judith Jarvis Thomson’s 
Infringement-Violation Account (IVA) and Russ Shafer-Landau’s Specificationist Account (SA). 
 Thomson’s account of rights conflict resolves it by claiming that rights have varying 
stringencies.  In one occasion, rights trump over other considerations. Other times, the 6
considerations have a stronger appeal and the rights gives way to the consideration. Apart from 
this notion of varying stringency, IVA makes use of a laddered examination of infringement and 
violation.  This will be examined in more detail below, but to just introduce the idea, one right is 7
supposedly infringed when a rights conflict occurs. This infringement then is subject to an 
examination of whether or not the infringement would constitute a violation. 
 Seeing that this account has several problems, Shafer-Landau publishes an article questioning 
Thomson’s IVA.  In his article, his goals were simple: to point out some deficiencies in Thomson’s 8
theory and to propose his Specificationist views. This view, SA, is committed to the idea that 
rights are maximally stringent.  That is, in all cases where rights are present, rights trump over all 9
other considerations. In cases of seeming rights conflict, said view argues that there is not a 
tension between two rights because one of the rights was not engaged in the situation.   10
 Shafer-Landau’s arguments in his article are intriguing and stimulating. His 
Specificationism is one that is a common reference in the literature of both Specificationism and 
rights conflict.  However, despite his work being looked upon in the field, there is hardly any 11
resource that tackles the arguments presented in the paper head-on.  The arguments he 12
presented to IVA strike the account at its very core. Nevertheless, Thomson has not posed a 
response to Shafer-Landau’s scathing remarks and neither does any of the authors that also 
utilize her account. Left untouched, the arguments against IVA and arguments for SA stand 
 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 153-154.6
 Thomson, “Self Defense and Rights,” in The Lindley Lecture (Kansas: University of Kansas, 1977), 10.7
 Russ Shafer-Landau, “Specifying Absolute Rights,” Arizona Law Review 37, no. 209.8
 Ibid, 209.9
 Ibid, 210.10
 Some works that cite Shafer-Landau’s article are: Liberto, “The Moral Specification of Rights: A Restricted 11
Account.” Jose Juan Moreso, “Ways of Solving Conflicts of Rights: Proportionalism and Specificationism,” 
Ratio Juris 25, no. 1 (2012). John Oberdiek, “Specifying Rights Out of Necessity,” Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 28, no. 1 (2008). Christopher Wellman, “On Conflicts between Rights,” Law and Philosophy 14, no. 3 
(1995). Grégoire Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).
 One that is critical of Shafer-Landau’s SA is Danny Frederick in “Pro-Tanto versus Absolute Rights,” The 12
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their ground. 
 The project of this thesis is to address Shafer-Landau’s points in his paper. This is 
discussed in two chapters: one is dedicated to diffusing Shafer-Landau’s attacks against IVA 
(Chapter 3); the other is to refute his arguments for SA (Chapter 4). Prior to these, an 
exposition of IVA and SA is in order (Chapter 2). 
II. EXPOSITION 
A. Infringement-Violation Account 
  The first account to be examined is that which allows for the existence of conflict of 
rights: the Infringement-Violation Account (IVA). This theory to be analyzed is a 
composite of works that utilize the infringement-violation distinction.  Mostly, 13
however, it stems from the work of Judith Jarvis Thomson to whom the distinction is 
owed.  14
  To IVA, when rights are in conflict, the way to resolve this is to reduce the 
stringency of a right while retaining that the situation is still within the scope of the 
right.  Consider an example commonly used in the literature of conflicting rights.  15 16
Suppose a hiker was exploring the mountains when suddenly a snowstorm engulfs the 
entire area he is in. The snowstorm is making the journey diﬃcult for the hiker. More 
than that, it is a deadly one and if the hiker does not find shelter soon, it would be a 
tragic fate for him. Luckily, the hiker sees a cabin nearby. He approaches the cabin but 
finds that despite the cabin being well-kept, nobody is home. Left without not much of a 
choice, the hiker lets himself in. Hours and days pass and the snowstorm does not abate. 
To survive, the hiker chopped up some furniture in the cabin for firewood and helps 
himself to the food therein. In such a case, is there a conflict of rights? 
  To IVA, yes there is. Particularly, what persists in the situation is a conflict between 
the cabin owner’s right to property and the hiker’s right to life. In the given example, the 
conflict arises because in the problem at hand, the two rights cannot be advanced at the 
same time. That is, only one of the two is performable. Now to resolve this, IVA reduces 
the stringency of the right to property. This is done by accommodating the other right in 
question, that is the hiker’s right to life. While still maintaining that the owner’s right to 
property is present in the situation, IVA adjusts by reducing its strength in order to allow 
the hiker’s right to life to be advanced.  17
 One contributor is Joel Feinberg. See Feinberg, “Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life,” 13
Tanner Lecture on Human Values (Michigan: The University of Michigan, 1977).
 Thomson, “Some Ruminations on Rights,” Arizona Law Review 19, no. 45 (1977): 47.14
 Shafer-Landau, “Specifying Absolute Rights,” 209.15
 Feinberg, “Voluntary Euthanasia,” 233.16
 Ibid.17
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  How it does this reduction of stringency, IVA proceeds to address the conflict in 
two stages: (1) probing if a right has been infringed, and; (2) if there is an infringement, 
probing if a right has been violated.  By “infringement”, Thomson means that another 18
right has been engaged. In contemporary setting, rights infringement has become 
synonymous to “violation,” “wronged,” “breach,” and “transgression,” among other 
interpretations, one example of which is the commonly used phrase “copyright 
infringement.” Thomson’s use of “infringement” deviates from these usual denotations. 
For Thomson and for IVA, when a right has been infringed, it does not necessarily mean 
that the right of the other person has been illegally disregarded. Instead, “infringement” 
in IVA only entails that the right has been merely interacted with. 
  Thomson’s “violation,” on the contrary, coincides with our usual understanding. A 
rights violation occurs when the interaction with the right is impermissible. Phrased 
diﬀerently, a violation obtains when the act committed by the person other than the 
right-bearer is judged to be wrong. In the hiker case, IVA claims that given the rights 
conflict, the hiker has infringed on the cabin owner’s right to property by helping himself 
in and using the resources present. The infringement, however, pace IVA, is permissible 
because the hiker’s life was the price to be paid. This permissibility of the act is what 
constitutes the hiker’s break in as a non-violation of the owner’s right to property. In 
other words, although the owner’s right to property has been infringed, no violation of 
the same right has occurred because the hiker is warranted to do as he did.  To fully 19
understand the distinction between infringement and violation, consider a revised 
account of the Cabin case. 
  Suppose that another hiker is treading another mountain. Similar to the original 
Cabin case, this hiker finds an unoccupied cabin along the way. He enters the Cabin 
without the permission of the owner and uses the food and other available resources just 
as the hiker in the unaltered case. However, one crucial element distinguishes this revised 
case from the original: there is no snowstorm present. In such a case, this hiker’s life is 
not at stake. He is simply a vandal who sought to make himself comfortable in the cabin 
on a sunny day. If so, it could not possibly be said that his right to life trumps over the 
cabin owner’s property. There is no permissible break-in. This evaluation of the altered 
hiker’s actions being impermissible or unjust is what constitutes a rights violation.  The 20
original Cabin case was a mere rights infringement because the break-in was found to be 
just; the revised Cabin case a rights violation because the act, in those specified 
circumstances, was unjust. 
  Finally, it should be noted that one feature prominently held by IVA is the notion 
 Thomson, “Some Rumination on Rights,” 47.18
 Feinberg, “Voluntary Euthanasia,” 23319
 Christopher Wellman, Rights, Forfeiture and Punishment, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 68-69.20
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of compensation.  Compensation here can be an act (e.g. apology) accorded to the 21
right-bearer or a material (e.g. furniture) provided to the right-bearer in exchange for the 
used resource. IVA’s concept of compensation stems from Thomson’s recognition that in 
moral dilemmas such as in the Cabin case, there is what she calls a “moral residue.”  The 22
hiker borrowed the cabin and used the resources available without the owner’s 
permission. Although he is permitted to do so, IVA maintains that the hiker could not 
simply leave the premises once the snowstorm abates without being upfront to the owner 
about it. The hiker is morally obliged, upon having used the owner’s properties, to 
reimburse what he has utilized. In his occupation of the cabin, there is a “residue” that 
the hiker needs to address. And the way to address this is to compensate. Where there is 
rights infringement and/or violation, compensation is in order. 
B. Specificationist account 
  On the issue of rights conflict, Specificationist Account (SA), as espoused by Russ 
Shafer-Landau, denies that such a conflict exists. Given a situation where there is a 
seeming tension between two or more rights, SA dispels this conundrum by positing that 
the right of the one of the agents in the situation is not operative.  This is due to that 23
the scope of the right does not include such particular situations. 
 Consider again the Cabin case mentioned in the previous section. Following Shafer- 
Landau, the problem of the Cabin case can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The cabin owner has an exclusive right to the use of the cabin. 
(2) Therefore all others have a duty not to use the cabin without the owner’s 
permission. 
(3) Therefore it is impermissible for anyone else to use the cabin without the owner’s 
permission. 
(4) But it is permissible for the hiker to use the cabin without permission.  24
  The four together, says SA, constitutes a contradiction. To avoid this, SA 
recommends that (1) be abandoned. (3), it is supposed, follows from (2) and (4) follows 
from (3). Hence, the only way to address the contradiction, is to dismiss (1). By 
abandoning (1), the rest of the claims can be tailored accordingly. What is/are SA’s 
reason for doing so? 
  To understand SA’s position on the non-existence of rights conflicts is to 
understand its conception of a right and a right’s content. If, for IVA rights are always 
operative, SA, on the contrary, holds that the content of a right includes its exceptions, 
 Thomson, “Self-Defense and Rights,” 11.21
 Thomson, The Realm of Rights, 84.22
 Shafer-Landau, “Specifying Absolute Rights,” 210.23
 Ibid, 209.24
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and that a right is changing as it is subject to later additions of exceptions. Let us discuss 
this one by one. 
  For example, SA does not hold that one has right to life simpliciter, that is an 
unqualified right. Rather, that someone has a right to property where this right includes 
every exception established.  One such exception could include the case where the 25
government needs the land for road widening. Since the land sequestration is directed at 
the good of the community, such a circumstance is added as an exception to the right to 
property. Hence, in SA, when one says that one has a right to property, this does not 
mean the right to property simpliciter as espoused by IVA, but a right to property that 
contains several exceptions such as the one supposed. 
  Apart from the inclusion of exceptions into the content of the right, SA maintains 
that these exceptions can increase. If there are novel or unexpected circumstances that are 
not extant exceptions of the right, but ones that should be, such circumstances could be 
added to the list of exceptions. This feature of post hoc patchwork is a feature exclusive to 
SA.  26
  Given these notion of rights, SA contends that in the Cabin case, insofar as the 
hiker is in a life-or-death situation where getting inside the and making use of the cabin 
is the only way to save his life, the owner does not a right to property in this particular 
situation. In other cases, sure, the cabin owner has a right to his property. But as 
understood in the SA structure, the right to property contains exclusions and one of such 
conclusions is when the someone is dying and the only way to save him is to permit 
entrance to the property. This way, SA deflects (1). 
 By averting from (1) SA is able to construe that rights conflict do not exist. More than 
that, it is able to stipulate, as Shafer-Landau does, that rights are absolute, i.e. maximally 
stringent.  27
  
III. RELIEVING IVA 
 In the course of promoting SA, Shafer-Landau had to show that IVA is in several ways 
inadequate. To do this, he directed his criticisms to two important aspects of IVA. The first attack 
is on IVA’s commitment to the notion of compensation. The second attack is focused on the 
relation of rights and duties. To dispute these claims and to take the load oﬀ of IVA is what 





A. On the compensation charges 
  With respect to the notion of compensation, Shafer-Landau has two problems: (1) 
that IVA needs to explain why some compensation is at times present where right 
infringement is not, and (2) that IVA needs to explain how infringement meets the 
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for compensation. Shafer-Landau’s inquiries are 
interesting and warrants a response. 
  There are instances where compensation is on the table, but without a trace of 
rights infringement. An example Shafer-Landau used to illustrate this point is when a 
customer drops by a gas station to fill up his car. The customer uses the product of the 
station, and from this, owes the gas station compensation in the form of payment for the 
resource. However, from this instance of compensation, no rights were infringed. Shafer-
Landau then prompts IVA to explain how this compensation can exist without any 
rights being infringed.  28
  This is indeed puzzling at first blush. But upon further examination, and with a few 
tools of logic, this can easily be dispelled. The IVA premise is that compensation is 
necessary if a rights infringement has been caused. Alternatively, we can express this as 
“If rights infringement (I), then compensation (C)”. Symbolically, this can be written as I 
→ C. 
  Shafer-Landau’s argument that compensation should also result to a rights 
infringement is, at best, fallacious. Using the above equation is useful to see this point. 
I → C 
            C 
            : I 
  This series of premises and conclusion is what is known as the fallacy of aﬃrming 
the consequent. This is exactly what Shafer-Landau does in his invocation of the gas 
station example and the like. In the example, there is, according to him, compensation 
owed. Because of this compensation, he then proceeds to find the rights infringements, is 
dismayed at the discovery that there is none, and faults IVA for this. Given the above 
fallacy, however, the search for rights infringement in the gas station example is in the 
first instance misguided. There is nothing that allows I to obtain from an instantiation of 
C, if the IVA tenets are to be followed. In no way is Shafer-Landau in a position to 
demand the existence of rights infringement in an instance where compensation is 
present. Because of this, there is no reason for IVA to resolve this particular concern. 
 Ibid, 216.28
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  A more pressing matter is the second inquiry on compensation. Shafer-Landau 
states that infringement should be a necessary and suﬃcient condition for compensation 
for the IVA program to set sail.  The necessary element is a given as provided by the fact 29
that if a right has been infringed, IVA acknowledges the need to compensate. The 
suﬃcient element, meanwhile, is controversial. IVA, he says, needs to prove suﬃciency. 
Otherwise, if infringement is not a suﬃcient condition, if IVA is in need of other reasons 
to make the jump to compensation being a suﬃcient condition, this will weaken one of 
IVA’s main tenets. In addition, these other reasons could be used by SA to make its case. 
Without having to say that a right has been infringed, SA could then point to these 
reasons which made suﬃcient the invocation of compensation. 
  This, I argue, is a hasty request. Similar to the first posed problem, Shafer-Landau’s 
positions seem intuitive. But similar to the other problem, this request for explanations 
on the necessity and suﬃciency conditions is ill-conceived. 
  IVA only promotes the relationship of infringement and compensation as: if there 
is infringement there is compensation owed, as expressed by the I →  C equation. The 
conditions of necessity and suﬃciency to apply to the I → C formula would be ascribing 
to IVA something that is beyond its scope. For something to be a necessary and suﬃcient 
condition, this should satisfy a one-to-one correspondence. That is, in terms of the 
infringement-compensation relation, to be a necessary and suﬃcient condition requires 
that infringement result to compensation and compensation result to infringement. 
Instead of the equation being “If there is infringement, then compensation is needed,” 
the necessary and suﬃcient condition Shafer-Landau reformulates the equation to 
“Compensation is needed if and only if there is infringement.” This makes it a two-way 
bridge between I and C resulting to I → C ∧ C → I. Symbolically, this tantamounts to I 
⇔ C. Nowhere does IVA press this material equivalence. And nowhere does it have to 
claim it need be so. For IVA to maintain its notion of compensation, it only needs to 
argue for the I → C relation. Abstractions from this implication is beyond the contours 
of IVA. 
B. On the right-duty-deontic judgment charge* 
  Apart from the supposed deficiencies on compensation, Shafer-Landau also 




Consider the cabin case again: 
(1) The cabin owner has an exclusive right to the use of the cabin. 
(2) Therefore all others have a duty not to use the cabin without the owner’s 
permission. 
(3) Therefore it is impermissible for anyone else to use the cabin without the owner's 
permission. 
(4) But it is permissible for the hiker to use the cabin without permission. 
  This breakdown, as mentioned in the previous chapter, presents to us a 
contradiction in that all four cannot be maintained. To extinguish this contradiction, 
Shafer-Landau posits that SA would deny (1). (2) follows from (1), (3) follows from (2), 
and (4) follows from (3). By denying (1) the rest of the equation are modified 
accordingly. IVA, however, as Shafer-Landau notes has not provided its answer as to 
which of the four it would deny.  30
  
  True enough, not one friend of IVA has identified which exactly among (1) - (4) 
IVA would come to abandon given the fact that not one has directly replied to Shafer-
Landau’s claims and demands as of writing. But, given the extant literature on IVA, 
specifically those by Thomson, it is possible to construe a route IVA would presumably 
take. Thomson, in many of her articles, discusses whether rights are absolute or not. By 
absolute, we mean that the right triumphs over other considerations at all costs. For 
Thomson, she defends the view that rights are not absolute in that there are situations 
where rights are not stringent.  One such situation is this Cabin case. If rights were 31
absolute, that is if the owner’s property right is absolute, it would not be permissible at all 
for the hiker to enter the premises under any circumstance. But as scholars who have 
chanced upon the hypothetical have admitted, the hiker is permitted to enter the cabin 
and use the resources available to him. This demonstrates that the property right of the 
cabin owner is not absolute.  Some special circumstances, such as the Cabin case, warrant 
the infringement of a right and thus renders its absolute status untenable. 
  Relating this back to Shafer-Landau’s demand of which IVA would deny, there is 
reason to believe that IVA would strike-through (1). In (1), it states “the cabin owner has 
an exclusive right to the use of the cabin.” IVA would not deny that the Cabin owner has 
a right in the present issue. It is this very recognition of the right that allows for the 
infringement and compensation to obtain. What IVA would deny, nevertheless, is the 
idea of “exclusive” right. This exclusivity is closely related—and to a certain extent similar
—to the aforementioned absolute status of rights. Property rights are absolute if they are 
the more stringent or more enforceable against all other considerations. Property rights 
are exclusive if they are stringent and enforceable regardless of the situation. Thomson 
*Special thanks to Prof. Boongaling for pointing out several mistakes. 
 Ibid, 210.30
 Thomson, “Self-Defense and Rights,” 11.31
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denies the supposed absoluteness of rights. As such, it is likely that Thomson would also 
deny this exclusivity. (1) then becomes “The cabin owner has a right to the use of the 
cabin” where the term “exclusive” is omitted. 
  The other demand with respect to rights, duties, and deontic judgments is that, 
according to Shafer-Landau, IVA has not proposed any theory on how to bar the 
inference from a full- fledged right to a full-fledged duty.  Recall that IVA posits that it 32
is permissible for the hiker to use the cabin. This deontic judgment is, Shafer-Landau 
believes, rooted from the lack of duty on the hiker’s part. But, IVA recognizes that the 
owner does in fact have a right in the present issue. Shafer-Landau then prompts IVA to 
explain how the existence of a right results to lack of duty, if full-fledged rights always 
entail full-fledged duties. 
  To answer this other demand, IVA does not need to bar the inference from rights 
to duties. As mentioned above, Thomson recognizes that full-fledged rights entail full-
fledged duties. Hence, there is no need for IVA to explain how the right to duty is to be 
barred as Shafer- Landau posits. IVA maintains that there is a property right, but this 
property right is not absolute and is amenable to other considerations. This dent in the 
property right, in so far as rights result to duties, is carried over to the duty of other 
people with respect to the property. As the property right of the owner is not absolute, 
the hiker does not have a duty to the owner in the particular case at hand. The inference 
from right to duty remains. 
 The agenda of this section was to discredit what Shafer-Landau has posited as IVA’s 
deficiencies. With the above, we believe that much has been established. But, this section could be 
extended further and provide a glimpse on a boost for IVA. 
 SA has a strictly formulated framework. It only allows for either the compliance or violation 
of a right. A right is complied with if it is not interfered with; a right is violated if it is, in any 
manner, meddled with. As attractive as this simplicity is, it simply cannot capture all the 
dynamics of a rights conflict. As shown by necessity cases such as the Cabin case, there are 
instances where it is permissible to interfere with a right without necessarily having to resort to a 
rights violation. IVA, by virtue of introducing the distinction between a rights infringement and a 
rights violation, provides moral theorists with a more expansive framework than the strict SA. 
IVA allocates an area of debate about the nature of the act, i.e. if it is unjust or not, with its 
diﬀerentiation of rights infringement and rights violation. Through this, it is possible to put a line 
between what actions are justifiable and which actions are not. 
  
 Shafer-Landau, “Specifying Absolute Rights,” 222.32
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IV. DOWNPLAYING SA 
 In his article, Shafer-Landau posits three arguments for SA: one, that SA is compatible with 
Particularism, i.e. the view that there can be no moral principles (hereinafter Argument 1); two, 
that SA presents a workable theory of the relation among rights, duty, and deontic judgments 
(Argument 2), and; three, that IVA fails Thomson’s explanatory eﬃcacy test and that SA rights 
are suﬃciently explanatory (Argument 3).  The second argument has been entertained in the 33
previous section. For reasons to be identified later, the third argument shall be examined first and 
then the other. It is the position of this section that the first and third arguments together are not 
compatible. 
  
A. Two inconsistent arguments 
  With regard to Argument 3, there are a couple of propositions at work here so a bit 
of unpacking is wanting. 
  In one of her articles, Thomson faults SA for being unable to suﬃciently explain 
why an act is permissible or not.  Based from this criticism, Shafer-Landau construes 34
what he believes as the explanatory test for Thomson.  Rights are explanatory if a 3536
moral principle  is conjoined with factual instances which together entail a more 37
particular conclusion. Given this feature, Shafer-Landau demonstrates that IVA fails the 
very same standards Thomson accuses SA of not being able to meet. How IVA fails said 
test, Shafer-Landau proves this in an aggregate of propositions. If my understanding is 
correct, the reasoning is as follows: 
 (P1) An account passes an explanatory test if it conjoins a moral principle and a factual 
claim that would result to a more particular conclusion. 
(P2) IVA does not use a moral principle. 
(C) IVA fails the explanatory test. 
  But before the conclusion can be held, Shafer-Landau needed to prove first that P2 
is correct. To posit that IVA does not use a moral principle in its explanatory venture, 
Shafer- Landau argues that there are no moral principles in the first place, so these 
cannot be at IVA’s disposal. Phrased diﬀerently, for IVA to say that it uses a moral 
principle and factual claim to prove explanatory eﬃcacy is false because there are no 
moral principles available to IVA. 
 Shafer-Landau, “Specifying Absolute Rights,” 223.33
 Thomson, “Self- Defense and Rights,” 9.34
 Shafer-Landau, “Specifying Absolute Rights,” 212.35
 Shafer-Landau, “Specifying Absolute Rights,” 212. 36
36 In large part, I believe Shafer-Landau’s interpretation and construal of the explanatory test is misplaced. But 
for the sake of argument, its truth is to be granted.
 Moral principle here coming to mean “X has a right”.37
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  Well and good. Proceeding then to the Argument 1, it stipulates that only SA is 
compatible with Particularism. Flipping the statement over, it states that IVA is 
incompatible with Particularism. Such a conclusion is proven in the following way: 
(P1*) Particularism uses narrowly tailored rights. 
(P2*) Any theory that uses narrowly tailored rights are compatible with Particularism. 
(P3*) SA uses narrowly tailored rights. 
(C*) Therefore SA compatible with Particularism. 
  Using the same idea, this is how the proof for IVA’s incompatibility with 
Particularism looks like: 
(P1**) Particularism uses narrowly tailored rights. 
(P2**) Any theory that uses narrowly tailored rights are compatible with Particularism. 
(P3**) IVA uses generally described rights. 
(C**) Therefore IVA is incompatible with Particularism. 
  These sets of premises and conclusions appear valid.  Alone, Argument 1 can be 
maintained. However, when the premises and conclusions from the Argument 3 are 
meshed with the set for the Argument 1, the problem surfaces. 
  Focus on P3** which states that IVA uses generally described rights.  The 38
ontological claim here for Argument 1 is that there are generally described principles 
such as rights. Focus now on the P2 of Argument 3. It says that IVA does not use a 
moral principle because there are no general moral principles to begin with. The 
ontological claim for this set of arguments meanwhile is that there are no generally 
described moral principles. Put succinctly, Argument 1 ascribes a positive ontological 
claim on generally described moral principles while Argument 3 ascribes a negative 
ontological claim on the same generally described moral principles. This inconsistency 
has disastrous consequences. Depending on which ontological claim is held, only one 
between Argument 1 and Argument 3 is tenable. 
  Let us take first the ontological claim that there are general moral principles. If this 
is true, or at least if this is the claim held, Argument 1 (IVA-Particularism 
incompatibility) is valid. However, by the same token, if the ontological claim that there 
are general moral principles is held, Argument 3 (IVA fails Thomson’s explanatory test) 
would not follow. To reiterate, the reason why IVA is said to fail the explanatory test is 
 By “generally described rights,” I am supposing Shafer-Landau meant the properties are taken to be applicable 38
in a wide range of circumstances without attending to their nuances. In a sense, this is equivalent to the terms 
“principle,” “moral principle,” “properties,” “moral properties,” “general rights,” and other similar terminologies 
as employed by Shafer-Landau in his article.
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because it cannot use moral principles which in turn is caused by the belief that there are 
no moral principles. To hold Argument 1 would be to give up Argument 3. 
  Conversely, we could also side with the ontological claim, for the sake of argument, 
that there no general moral principles. If this position is held, Argument 3 would then be 
tenable. But, in exchange, if we think there are no general moral principles, Argument 1 
could not be valid. To say that there are no moral principles is counter the premise that 
IVA uses generally described moral principles. In this case, to hold Argument 3 amounts 
to forsaking Argument 1. 
  Maintaining both Arguments 1 and 3 at the same time gives us an inconsistent 
framework. The one only nullifies the other and vice versa. Nevertheless, Shafer-Landau 
could still save the enterprise by picking either one of the arguments. This does not 
assure though that the argument chosen would establish still the positive case for SA. 
B. An attempt to avoid the inconsistency 
  Should Shafer-Landau decide to retain Argument 1, he would have to side with 
the positive ontological claim on general principles. Recall that the claim to 
Particularism is that each instance is diﬀerent from another and so the judgment on the 
one cannot be the same on the other, which makes general moral principles impossible to 
come by. Because SA could accommodate this, it is then the only doctrine compatible 
with Particularism. 
  To this, IVA could submit a rejoinder saying that it, too, is compatible with 
Particularism. To say that it is not because it uses general moral principles is a 
misdirected attack. IVA is compatible with Particularism. Sure, IVA begins with general 
rights such as the right to life, liberty, and property. However, IVA claims that rights are 
not absolute. Rights, for IVA, could win in one occasion and lose in another. This stance 
allows IVA to change positions depending on the situation, similar to the requirements 
of Particularism. In addition, IVA proceeds to the further examinations of infringement 
and violation to decide the permissibility or impermissibility of the act. These 
examinations also enable its general principles of rights to be situated in diﬀerent 
contexts without necessarily having to result to the same single outcome. By virtue of 
rights not being absolute and of the infringement and violation steps, IVA enables a 
case-to-case analysis that does not transpose the moral property of a natural property to 
other natural properties like it. 
  The misstep I think rests on Shafer-Landau’s insertion of Particularism in the 
picture. He believes that the principles targeted by Particularism are equal to the rights 
principles used by IVA. This is mistaken. Particularism’s aim is directed to principles that 
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function normatively and/or deliberatively.  Principles function normatively when they 39
constitute properties for right- and wrong-making. Principles function deliberatively 
when they aid the agent on what to do. An example of a moral principle is the utilitarian 
principle of maximizing utility. This utilitarian principle embodies both the normative 
and deliberative function simultaneously.  It is normative when it is used to examine 40
when an act is right or wrong, e.g. when the principle of maximizing utility is used to 
decide between saving five people versus saving one where the utilitarian opts for the 
former. It is deliberative when the same principle is capable of dictating what should be 
done, e.g. that the agent should save the five instead of the one because saving the five 
maximizes utility. As per conceptual design, the moral principles attacked by 
Particularism is said to be exceptionless, explanatory, and interrelated. By exceptionless, 
principles are law-like generalizations where if A is found to result to B, A should in all 
occasions, without exclusion, result to B. By explanatory it means that the principles are 
capable of explaining or justifying moral claims. Finally, principles as interrelated means 
that they are part of a system. 
  In Shafer-Landau’s article, what he considers the moral principles are the rights 
that both IVA and SA reflect in their respective theories. Examples of such principles 
then would be right to life, right to property, and so on. However, IVA does not coincide 
with either the conceptual makeup nor with the functions of Particularism’s principles. 
One of the requirements to be met by a concept of principle is that it be exceptionless. 
As we have said, IVA does not promote an exceptionless characteristic of rights as it 
believes that rights are not absolute. With this, IVA deviates from the principles that 
Particularism frowns upon. 
  Another loophole is that Principles, according to moral Particularism, function 
either normatively or deliberatively. The right to, say, life in IVA does not function 
normatively nor deliberatively. For it to be normative, IVA’s right to life should give a 
reason why an act is right or wrong. Given the IVA framework, however, the right to life, 
or any right it recognizes for the matter, does not inherently contain the rightness or 
wrongness nor the goodness or badness of an action. Apart from the right, it should be 
recalled, IVA makes use of the infringement-violation distinction. If the right 
infringement is not a violation, it is permissible. If the right infringement is a violation, it 
is not permissible. This permissibility/impermissibility is what determines whether the 
act is right or wrong, whether it is good or bad, not the right to life itself. 
  To pin the moral principles on the rights is I believe a misattribution on Shafer-
Landau’s part. The right is not a moral principle in the sense that moral Particularism 
demands. If one wants to examine the moral principles which animate a structure of 
 Mark Lance and Margaret Little, “Particularism and Antitheory,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, 39
ed. David Copp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 569- 570.
 Ibid.40
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rights, it should direct its attention to what makes the act permissible or impermissible. 
  This I think is the same reason why Argument 3 would not also work should 
Shafer- Landau opt for it. Should Shafer-Landau decide to retain Argument 3, he 
should hold that there are no general principles. Because there are no general properties, 
IVA fails Thomson’s test. Even if we grant that Argument 3 is valid, IVA could still hold 
its ground by pointing out a hole in Shafer-Landau’s argument. A theory is supposedly 
explanatory if it compounds a moral principle with factual claims to result to a more 
detailed conclusion. In IVA an example of this fashion would be the conjunction of the 
moral claim “Everyone has a right to their property” and the factual claims “the hiker is 
stranded”, “there is a snowstorm” and so on. This results to the judgment that it is 
permissible for the hiker to enter. But the moral principle in the strict Particularist sense 
that Shafer-Landau seeks is not present in any of these. 
C. SA not suﬃciently explanatory 
  Before this section ends, I would like to go back to Argument 3. Apart from the 
fact that the third argument claims that IVA fails the explanatory test, it also claims that 
SA is explanatorily superior. So far the former has been addressed. To complete the 
examination, the latter also need to be fleshed out. 
  SA is explanatorily superior because it supposedly can give an explanation on the 
permissibility or impermissibility of an action. In the Cabin case, SA deems it 
permissible for the hiker to enter the cabin even without the consent of the cabin owner. 
It is permissible on the grounds that he has no duty to recognize against the owner’s 
property. This non-existence of duty, in turn, results from the non-existence of the right 
to property in such a case. For easier reading, SA’s reasoning is as follows: 
(right) The owner has no right to property against the hiker in the circumstance 
provided.  
(duty) Therefore, the hiker does not have duty not to use the cabin. 
(deontic judgment) Therefore, it is permissible for the hiker to use the cabin.  41
  Because the series of statements is consistent, Shafer-Landau calls this SA’s 
explanatory eﬃcacy. Banking heavily on the right-duty-deontic judgment tripartite, 
Shafer-Landau argues that since only SA can account for this kind of consistency, SA 
then has the better hand. 
  IVA, he assumes, cannot manifest this consistency in right-duty-deontic judgment 
triad. But why should this view of IVA be accepted? IVA too could construe a consistent 
 This is patterned after the initial formulations of the hiker case.41
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flow of these three elements. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, when it comes to 
the (1)-(4) breakdown of the Cabin case, IVA could well deny (1) and modify the rest of 
the series, accordingly. In this modification, like SA, it too could have a continuous flow 
from right to duty to deontic judgment. In this manner, there is no reason to suppose 
that SA is better simply because it has a uniform framework. IVA can achieve this same 
consistency. 
  However, this supposed suﬃcient explanation allures questioning. It is said to be 
explanatory because it can readily make sense of the triad. The hiker is freezing in the 
snowstorm, therefore, the cabin owner has no exclusive right in this particular instance. 
From this no right, the duty and deontic judgment follow. SA says that when we invoke 
rights, it is not meant that rights are unqualified. Rights, under SA, come with several 
exceptions such as that in the cabin case. But here, we are prompted to ask, what is the 
explanation for these exceptions? Certainly, it is implausible to say that the right at the 
very beginning of its historical or conceptual recognition has already been attributed 
with these exceptions. Even SA itself in Shafer-Landau’s account recognizes that 
exceptions can still be added later on should we find ourselves in novel and unexpected 
circumstances. So the question arises again, what are the reasons for adopting these 
exceptions? 
  SA is yet to give an explanation of this angle of its theory. It is easy to say that SA 
is explanatory because it follows the tripartite of rights, duties, and deontic judgments. 
But how it arrives at the exceptions of the right in the first place is a mystery. It is 
incumbent on SA to provide an account of how exactly exceptions to rights are 
construed and what are the variables for determining such exceptions in the same way 
that it is also incumbent on IVA to explain why the right is not absolute. Whatever 
justification SA has for discerning these exceptions, these resources are also available for 
IVA. 
  Shafer-Landau lauds SA because it supposedly can explain why an act is 
permissible or impermissible. However, this very determination of permissibility or 
impermissibility is begging the question. Before SA can say for certain that it has 
explanatory eﬃcacy and is therefore superior to IVA, it should first take time to address 
this anomaly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Competing rights are a prevalent occurrence. It is in home when parents assert their rights 
over their children’s rights. It is in school when teachers use academic freedom to override the 
parent’s or the student’s inclinations. It is in the workplace when an employer requests 
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something from an employee. It is in the streets when the government takes a parcel of land 
from a property owner. 
 Because of its omnipresence, scholars have been preoccupied with this particular issue for 
quite a while now. As they delved into this phenomenon, what they have found to be the most 
pressing is to find out how to resolve this. Thomson and her colleagues resorted to reducing the 
stringency of a right in question while maintaining that there is indeed a conflict of rights. On 
top of that, her proposed solution incorporates the infringement-violation distinction (IVA). 
 Shafer-Landau responded to Thomson’s theory and argued that specification (SA) was a 
better solution. In SA there are no conflict of rights because only one right is operative. Where 
rights conflict, says SA, the stringency of rights should be retained while the scope be reduced. 
This is the gist that animates SA. 
 The objective of this thesis was to oﬀer a counter-response to Shafer-Landau’s claims. First, 
it has been shown that Shafer-Landau’s accusations on IVA’s deficiencies were unwarranted. The 
demand of infringement-compensatory explication rested on a misunderstanding of the relation 
between infringement and compensation. The demand for an explanation of the relationship 
between right and duty was already provided by IVA in one of Thomson’s works. Second, this 
thesis has demonstrated that Shafer-Landau’s claims to SA’s superiority are problematic. His 
first and third arguments for SA’s superiority are inconsistent with each other because they hold 
two diﬀerent ontological claims. His second argument for the superiority has been undermined 
with the provided right-duty relation.  
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